I found it difficult to compare our own relationship to those of others, because the relationships of my friends are quite similar. But if you read about other relationships in magazines... then I don't get why they stay together. What I like most in our relationship is that we can be ourselves, and that we give each other the opportunity to become the sort of people we'd like to be, and that our relationship is not at a standstill. I have the idea that this is often not so in other relationships.
The above statements were provided by a female participant in Study 3 who verbalized her troubles with questions that asked her to evaluate her own relationship with those of others. However, her explication is rather paradoxical because it runs counter to her initially mentioned troubles with social comparison. Not only this participant, but most people in general give evidence for the importance of social comparison when they explain their difficulties in comparing their own situation to that of others. Such explanations usually incorporate explicit references to social comparison such as the fact that their own situation is unique and different from that of others, such as conveyed by the respondent above, or references to the dilemma of possible comparisons with better-off others on the one hand, and comparisons with worse-off others on the other hand. All in all, such considerations must inevitably become apparent by means of social comparison activities. Furthermore, despite her reflections, the respondent's statements conclude with the assessment that her own relationship flourishes and develops in a way that is more positive and less negative than the relationship of others. This conclusion may be a spontaneous expression of the general inclination to evaluate oneself as more positively and less negatively than others (cf. Taylor & Brown, 1988, 1994). Taylor and Brown reviewed a substantial body of literature and concluded that there exists a pervasive tendency for people to perceive themselves as superior to others, and suggested that this desire to self-enhancement has primarily the function of attaining and maintaining a positive mental health.
1. This chapter is based on Oldersma, Buunk, and De Dreu (1998). Preliminary analyses of some of the data in this chapter were reported in two articles, namely Oldersma, De Dreu, and Buunk (1995), and Oldersma & Buunk (1997).
In his influential paper on downward comparison theory, Wills (1981) offers a theoretical analysis of the cognitive mechanisms people may use for coping with stressful events and circumstances, and assumed that the need for self-enhancement would be stronger when people experience some kind of threat to their subjective well-being. Wills (1987) discussed various cognitive mechanisms aimed at achieving downward comparison that mainly overlapped with the cognitive strategies suggested in the selective evaluation model proposed by Taylor et al. (1983). First of all, Wills (1987) proposed strict downward comparison with a target who is obviously worse off than the self as a coping mechanism. According to Wills (1981), this can be a passive process, in which individuals encounter inferior comparison targets with whom they can achieve downward comparisons, for instance through TV shows or magazines. In addition, downward comparison can also be a process of active comparison in which individuals cognitively construct a downward comparison, or derogate others' good abilities and personal attributes. Such cognitive downward comparison processes enable people to obtain a relatively favorable evaluation of themselves and their situation.
Wills (1987) as well as Taylor et al. (1983) advanced various cognitive mechanisms of selective evaluation through which individuals who experience a decrease in subjective well-being may obtain a more favorable evaluation of their situation and though which they may restore their well-being. These strategies of selective evaluation, which people may use in concert, include: (1) making downward comparison with worse-off others (cf. Wills, 1981); (2) selectively focusing on attributes that make them appear advantaged (i.e., dimensional comparison; Taylor et al., 1983); (3) creating hypothetical worse worlds by comparing one's current situation with what could have happened; (4) construing benefit from the victimizing event; and (5) manufacturing normative standards against which victims can compare themselves in such a way that may make their own adjustment appear exceptional. Although the strategies of downward comparisons, dimensional comparisons, and self-evaluation against comparative standards seem to involve social comparison activities, some researchers point out the possibility that these strategies may not necessarily involve truly social comparisons (cf. Buunk & Ybema, 1995; see also Wood, 1996, for more thorough discussions). Nevertheless, such strategies may also reflect the evaluation resulting from a cognitive process of constructing imaginary comparison others and comparison dimensions, aimed at making the perception of one's situation more acceptable.
A number of studies have provided evidence that individuals who experience some type of life stress may employ cognitive downward comparison as a coping strategy in order to improve the perception of their situation. For instance, in an interview study among breast cancer patients, Wood et al. (1985) clearly demonstrated that a majority of patients made downward comparisons, that is, they evaluated that their own adjustment to breast cancer was in some respects better than other women with breast cancer. Jensen and Karoly (1992) found that patients suffering from chronic pain showed a stronger tendency to use downward comparison and consequently experienced lower levels of depression. In a sample of individuals covered by the Disablement Insurance Act, Buunk and Ybema (1995) found that people experiencing stress were more likely to engage in cognitive downward comparison, which positively affected individuals' evaluations of their situation one year later. On the basis of such findings, it can be argued that cognitive downward comparison might be an effective strategy for reducing the aversive consequences of relational discontent, and might thus result in a relatively more favorable evaluation of the relationship.
In research examining the effects of downward comparison, participants are usually provided with social comparison information (cf. Wood, 1989, 1996). Such studies, however, do not assess the active, cognitive downward comparison process that has been emphasized in the previous discussion. Therefore, to examine experimentally whether cognitive downward comparison improves perceived relationship quality, the current research employed a new paradigm that induced participants to actively engage in cognitive downward social comparison.
As noted earlier in the current thesis, individuals often display a reluctance to admit that they actually compare themselves with others. This reticence about social comparison activities may result from a lack of awareness or problems in selectivity, recall, and aggregation (cf. Wood, 1996). On the other hand, individuals may also be reluctant to admit that they compare themselves with others, because some people lack an interest in social comparison information, and indeed, because they seldom do engage in social comparison. In other words, the extent to which people compare themselves with others may vary among individuals, thus pointing to the possibility there are considerable individual differences in the tendency to engage in social comparison (c.f. Brickman and Bulman, 1977; Hemphill & Lehman, 1991; Taylor et al., 1992; Wills, 1981). Gibbons and Buunk (1999) have elaborated this notion by developing and validating a measure of social comparison orientation to assess individual differences in the tendency toward social comparison. They proposed the concept of social comparison orientation to refer to the personality disposition of individuals to compare their accomplishments, their situation, and their experiences with those of others in similar circumstances. In this chapter, it is explored to what extent the consequences of cognitive downward social comparison are moderated by individual differences in social comparison orientation.
To install an active, cognitive downward comparison process similar to that described by authors such as Taylor et al. (1983), Wills (1987) and Buunk and Ybema (1995), the current studies employed a manipulation of cognitive downward comparison that is new in social comparison research. Participants were induced to actively engage in cognitive downward social comparison by employing a thought-generating task in which participants were asked to explicitly describe positive qualities of their relationship which they consider to be better than most others (hereafter referred to as the comparison thought-generating task). Thus, participants are deliberately prompted to focus on the superiority of their own relationships over those of others, which, in turn, will supposedly boost individual's perceived quality of the relationship. The present studies also included a control condition to test our assumption that it is specifically downward comparison that enhances the relationship evaluation, and not the fact that our instruction induced an increased salience of the positive features of the relationship. Participants in this control condition were presented with a similar thought-generating task but instead were asked to describe positive qualities of their relationship which they consider as good (hereafter referred to as the no-comparison thought-generating task). In contrast to participants assigned to the comparison thought-generating task, those in the no-comparison thought-generating task were instructed to make relationship-evaluations against an absolute, noncomparative standard. It was expected that in the former --downward comparison - condition individuals would subsequently evaluate their relationship more favorable than those in the latter --no-comparison-- condition.
The experimental paradigm was derived from Salancik (1974, 1976) and Seligman, Fazio and Zanna (1980). They reasoned that people's cognitions, attitudes, and beliefs can be affected by manipulating the recall of specific attributes and behaviors performed in the past, or by making specific dimensions more salient than others. Seligman et al. (1980) asked intimate partners to indicate either the intrinsic reasons or the extrinsic reasons for being in their relationship. The intrinsic reasons emphasized the couple's enjoyment of each other as motivations to maintain the relationship. Extrinsic reasons stressed the external rewards associated with their partner. It was found that the induced salience of extrinsic reasons led participants to express less love than those induced to the intrinsic cognitive set.
In each experiment participants took part in a study that was announced as a study intended to develop a questionnaire for which we needed individuals' thoughts about their intimate relationships. The experimental paradigm was a thought-generating task which asked participants to generate positive qualities on which they considered themselves (self-enhancement, Study 1), their intimate partners (partner-enhancement, Studies 2 and 3), or their own relationships (relationship-enhancement, Study 3) in noncomparative or comparative terms. Study 1 examined the effect of cognitive downward comparison on relationship quality. Studies 2 and 3 tested whether these effects were moderated by participants' relational discontent and their social comparison orientation.
The main purpose of the fourth study was to test whether cognitive downward comparison boosts people's evaluations of their relationship in a positive direction. A second purpose of Study 1 was to explore to what extent self- and partner-enhancing social comparison may have a differential effect on relationship evaluation. It was assumed (see Chapter 3 of the present thesis) that people would consider self-enhancement more socially undesirable than partner-enhancement, which, in turn, may induce them to make public statements about themselves as a partner that are more modest than their statements about their intimate partners. Following this line of reasoning, it was presumed that people will be more reluctant to engage in self-enhancing than in partner-enhancing downward comparison. Thus, it was supposed that the self-enhancement thought-generating task will be experienced as more difficult than the partner-enhancement thought-generating task, and as a consequence, that self-enhancement will exert a weaker impact on the evaluation of the relationship than partner-enhancement (e.g., Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991; Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 1996).
It should be noted, however, that individual's self-reported evaluations may be biased, because, for instance, individuals may be unaware of their true sentiment (i.e., satisfaction) about the partner or the relationship, or because their answers to self-report items are influenced by the social desirability of response alternatives or by demand characteristics of the experimental situation. Therefore, in addition to dependent self-report measures, we employed a more indirect, unobtrusive measure of attitudes toward the relationship by recording the response latencies to the questions on relationship satisfaction and commitment. Fincham, Garnier, Gano-Phillips, and Osborne (1995) provide an initial example of research incorporating the cognitive accessibility-based approach to attitudes (see Fazio, 1995) in the study of relationships. Fazio (1995) proposed that attitude accessibility reflects the strength of association in memory between a given object (e.g., one's partner or one's relationship with the partner) and a given evaluation (e.g., satisfactory), and that accessibility in memory determines the latencies of response to attitudinal questions. We would like to suggest that cognitive downward comparison will not only enhance relationship satisfaction, but will also make the evaluation of one's relationship cognitively more accessible. Moreover, according to Fazio (1995), attitude extremity is typically related to the attitude's accessibility in memory, that is, to its salience. Assuming that participants would hold a more favorable attitude toward their relationship following the downward comparison thought-generating task than after the no-comparison thought-generating task, participants in the former condition were expected to show shorter response times to the questions of the dependent variables than those in the latter condition.
Participants
Ninety-four undergraduates at University of Groningen (57 women and 37 men) who were currently involved in a relationship participated in the study (78 dating relationships, 16 cohabiting, none were married). They participated in what they thought was a research on "Test Validation." The average duration of their relationship was 2.2 years (ranging from 1 month to 7.1 years). The mean age of the sample was 22.1 years, with a range from 18 to 28 years. All participants were paid 7.5 Dutch guilders (approximately U.S. $4.5) for their participation.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The design was a 2 x 2 factorial with two levels of target (self vs. partner) and two levels of cognitive set (no-comparison versus comparison). Participants were randomly assigned to list as many as possible self- or partner-evaluations in either noncomparative or comparative terms.
The study was presented via Apple MacIntosh computers, connected to a central server. All instructions and questions were presented on the computer screen and questions could be answered by means of a keyboard. Assurance was given that the data would be treated confidentially. Participants were run in groups ranging from 2 to 8. On arrival at the laboratory, the experimenter explained that the purpose of the research was the construction and validation of a variety of relationship questionnaires with a computer-administered experiment. The participants were told that they could start the computer-administered procedure by hitting a key and that they could proceed at their own pace through the computer program. Each individual was then led to an individual booth and seated in front of a microcomputer.
Participants answered first a number of questions about their gender, age, duration of their relationship, and other relevant characteristics to familiarize them with the computerized test procedure. Next, the experimental task was introduced.
Manipulation of cognitive downward comparison
Participants were told that one purpose of the study concerned the "development of the Groningen Relationship Evaluation Test, for which we need many evaluations of intimate relationships." Hereafter, participants were assigned randomly to one of the following conditions. Participants in the self no-comparison condition (n = 23) were asked to generate as many as possible reasons why they are good partners. Participants in the self comparison condition (n = 23) were asked why they considered themselves as better partners than most others. Participants in the partner no-comparison condition (n = 23) and in the partner comparison condition (n = 25) were instructed to describe why their boy/girl friends were respectively good partners or better partners than most others. All participants were instructed to write down as many reasons of the specified type as they could think of --but at least five - on a piece of paper. Once they had finished, they were instructed to press "Return", at which point the computer screen cleared and displayed the instruction to enter the five reasons which they considered to be most important into the computer.
Hereafter, participants completed computer-administered measures of satisfaction and commitment. Next, participants were orally debriefed and asked not to discuss the study with others. After being paid for their participation, participants were thanked and dismissed.
Dependent Measures
The measures of relationship satisfaction and commitment were modeled on questionnaires used by Rusbult (e.g., Rusbult, 1980, 1983), and were, following Fincham and Bradbury's (1987) recommendation, global, evaluative questions rather than domain-specific questions. Satisfaction was measured by four items: "In general, how satisfying is your relationship?" (1 = not at all and 9 = extremely), "How much happiness and enjoyment do you get out of your relationship?" (1 = very little and 9 = very much), "How does your relationship compare to your ideal?" (1 = far from ideal and 9 = it is ideal), and "All things considered, how negative or positive do you stand on your relationship?," (1 = very negative and 9 = very positive). Commitment was measured by eight items, such as "For what length of time would you like your relationship to last?" (1 = a month or less and 9 = ten years or more), "To what extent do you feel committed to your relationship, even when you are less satisfied with your partner?" (1 = not at all and 9 = extremely), and "How likely is it that you will end your relationship in the near future?" (1 = not at all likely to end and 9 = extremely likely to end; recoded). Single averaged measures of satisfaction (Cronbach's alpha = .82) and commitment (Cronbach's alpha = .93) were formed.
The questions on satisfaction and commitment were answered by pressing one of the numerical keys (1 through 9) on the keyboard of the computer, after which the next question was presented on the computer screen. The latencies of response (from question onset to response) were recorded to the nearest millisecond by a software clock. Also, to control for individual differences in latencies, baseline response times were assessed by recording the latencies of response to the biographical questions. By doing so, the general speed of responding can serve as a covariate, thus reducing error variance due to individual differences in speed of responding that are unrelated to accessibility, and enhancing statistical power (cf. Fazio, 1990).
Analyses of the dependent variables relationship satisfaction and commitment.
Participant's average satisfaction and commitment ratings were subjected to a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with target (self versus partner) and cognitive set (no-comparison versus downward comparison) as the independent variables2. Our primary prediction on these measures was that participants would perceive higher relationship quality following the downward comparison thought-generating task rather than following the no-comparison thought-generating task. The ANOVA revealed indeed that participants in the downward comparison condition reported more satisfaction (M = 7.67) than participants in the no-comparison condition (M = 6.79), F(1, 90) = 8.95, p < .01. There was no difference between participants who generated their thoughts about the self and the partner. Cognitive set did not interact significantly with target, F < 1.0, ns.
The ANOVA on the commitment measure indicated that participants who were induced to engage in enhancing self- and partner-evaluations felt more strongly committed (M = 7.51) to their relationship than participants who were instructed to make noncomparative evaluations (M = 6.83), F(1, 90) = 5.92, p < .02. There was again no significant difference between evaluations of self and partner on commitment, F = 2.9, ns. The interaction between both independent variables was not significant, F < 1.0, ns.
Response Latencies. As is typically the case with response times (cf. Fazio, 1990), the average response latencies were positively skewed. Therefore, as recommended by Fazio, the response times were subjected to reciprocal transformations. Also, to reduce the possible impact of outlier response latencies on the analyses, those over 3 standard deviations from the mean were excluded. We then computed for each participant the latency indexes by averaging the recorded response times for each question of the dependent variable in separate indexes. Likewise, for each participant, a baseline response time was computed averaging the response times from presenting the biographical questions to entering the responses in one index. All data analyses were performed on the transformed scores, but for the sake of clarity, we report the retransformed latencies.
Subsequently, the transformed response latencies to the questionnaires of satisfaction and commitment were submitted to two-way (Target X Cognitive Set) analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs), with the baseline index for response time as a covariate3. In line with the above reported effects, cognitive set had significant effects on the latency indexes of satisfaction, F(1, 89) = 4.96, p < .03, and commitment, F(1, 89) = 5.13, p < .03. That is, as predicted, the average response latencies on both indexes were lower in the comparison condition than in the no-comparison condition. The adjusted means, following a retransformation back to the original metric of seconds, were 9.63 and 11.02 on the satisfaction index, respectively, and 11.29 and 12.60 on the commitment index, respectively. Thus, cognitive downward comparison seems indeed to increases the accessibility of the attitude toward one's relationship.
Supplemental analyses
A number of supplemental analyses were done to control for a number of alternative interpretations of the data. In the first place, it would seem possible that those in the comparison condition generated more qualities of the self and the partner than in the no-comparison condition. Thus, the effects of cognitive downward comparison may have been primarily due to the greater number of qualities generated in the social comparison condition relative to the no-comparison condition. We had available the number of qualities generated in the various conditions before the five most important ones were typed into the computer. There was no effect of cognitive set, F(1, 90) = 2.53, ns, upon the number of reasons generated. To determine whether the number of qualities did account for the effects on satisfaction and commitment, two 2 (Target) by 2 (Cognitive Set) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) were performed, with the number of qualities included as a covariate. Both analyses revealed that the main effects of cognitive set on satisfaction and commitment remained statistically significant F(1, 89) = 7.33, p < .01, and F(1, 89) = 4.51, p < .05, respectively.
A second reason that those in the comparison condition reported more satisfaction and stronger feelings of commitment may be that the responses of participants were affected by the positivity of the qualities they had generated. That is, participants in the comparison condition may have generated qualities of the self or the partner that were more positive than participants in the no-comparison condition. It might thus be possible that the beneficial effects of cognitive downward comparison on perceived relationship quality are not due to the fact that individuals actively compared their relationship with that of others, but rather to the likely greater positivity of the qualities generated in the social comparison condition relative to the no-comparison condition.
This issue was dealt with by replicating all of the major analyses by controlling for the positivity of the generated qualities. First, participants were asked to rate the valence of the self-generated qualities. At the end of the experimental procedure, each quality that had been entered into the computer by the respondent (i.e., the thought-listing task asked them to enter the five reasons which they considered as most important into the computer) was presented on the computer screen again. Participants were asked to rate each quality on 4-point scales ranging from not positive at all to very positive. The positivity ratings were subjected to two-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) with target and cognitive set as the independent variables. The analyses yielded no effects whatsoever, Fs < 1.06, ns. Further, to determine whether participants' positivity ratings did account for the effects on satisfaction and commitment, two 2 (Target) by 2 (Cognitive Set) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) were performed after adding positivity as a covariate4. Both analyses revealed that the main effects of cognitive set on satisfaction and commitment remained statistical reliable, F(1, 89) = 7.93, p < .01, and F(1, 89) = 5.34, p < .03, respectively.
In addition, we had two independent judges rate the qualities on 5-point scales ranging from very negative to very positive. The judges were blind to the hypothesis and experimental conditions, and the Cohen's Kappa for interrater agreement was .88. The analyses of variance on the positivity of the qualities was repeated, and again, no effects reached statistical significance, F < 1.40, ns. Thus, the two judges did not rate the qualities in the no-comparison condition differently from those generated in the comparison condition. The foregoing analyses of covariance was repeated treating the positivity ratings of the judges as covariate. Again, the main effects of cognitive set on satisfaction and commitment remained, F(1, 89) = 7.93, p < .01, and F(1, 89) = 5.34, p < .03, respectively. In sum, the results of these analyses suggested that our findings were not artifacts of the positivity of the qualities but that they were due to the effects of cognitive downward comparison.
2 Gender did not qualify any of the reported effects in the studies reported in this chapter and thus will not be further considered in the analyses.
3 Before performing the analyses of covariance, preliminary analyses confirmed that the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes within both conditions was upheld.
4 Before performing the analyses of covariance, preliminary analyses confirmed that the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was upheld.
Consistent with our predictions, Study 1 provided evidence that perceived relationship quality, i.e. satisfaction and commitment, can be influenced by asking people to engage in a cognitive downward comparison process, and to evaluate themselves or their intimate partner in comparative terms. That is, following the downward comparison thought-generating task, participants displayed more relationship satisfaction and stronger feelings of commitment to the relationship than participants assigned to the no-comparison thought-generating task. Moreover, the effects of the downward comparison manipulation on the unobtrusive measures of response latencies underscore the strength of these findings, as participants in the downward comparison conditions not only evaluated their relationship more positively than those in the no-comparison conditions, but also needed shorter response times to answer the questionnaires on relationship satisfaction and commitment to the relationship.
Also, additional analyses were performed to rule out two potential confounds, i.e. the possibility that the number of qualities generated differed between the comparison and no-comparison conditions, and that the qualities generated in both conditions differed in valence, and as a consequence, that the differential number or valence of the listed qualities would account for the demonstrated effects of cognitive downward comparison on the perceived quality of the relationship. The analyses provided convincing evidence that these explanations could not account for the results. The number of the qualities generated did not differ between both conditions, and controlling for the number of qualities left the effects virtually unchanged. Moreover, the positivity of the qualities did not differ between the two conditions according to the participants and independent judges, and the effects stayed the same when controlling for the positivity of the qualities. These analyses contribute to the validity of the experimental manipulation.
The manipulation of target (self versus partner) did not have differential effects on satisfaction and commitment to the relationship. This may reflect the fact that participants in the current studies are in an interdependent relationship in which their outcomes are strongly related, which may link their recollections about themselves and their partners with each other. Indeed, Aron and their colleagues (cf. Aron & Aron, 1996; Aron, Aron, & Smolan, 1992; Aron, Aron, Tudor & Nelson, 1991; see also Agnew, Van Lange, Rusbult & Langston, 1998) demonstrated that among close partners the cognitive representations of the self and the partner are closely interconnected, and are even perceived as overlapping.
Although the findings of Study 1 have both theoretical and methodological strengths, it is limited in that it examined the short-term involvements of undergraduates. Therefore, to ensure external validity and applied value of our findings, a major purpose of the second study was to replicate the findings from Study 1 in a non-student sample of individuals who had been in relationships for a long period of time. In this study, the self-enhancing conditions were omitted and the manipulation of cognitive downward comparison consisted of a thought-generating task in which participants were asked to evaluate their intimate partner in comparative or noncomparative terms. This was undertaken for three reasons. First, Study 1 did not yield differential effects for self- and partner-enhancement; secondly, despite the absence of differential effects on relationship quality, it was assumed (see Chapter 3 of the present thesis) that self-enhancement was considered more socially undesirable than partner-enhancement, thus raising the possibility that participants may experience difficulties with questions that ask them to evaluate themselves against other persons. Thirdly, we assume that people remain in their relationships because of the qualities of the partner rather than because of their own qualities as a partner.
Another goal of Study 2 was to determine whether the effect of cognitive downward comparison on the perceived quality of the relationship specifically occurred for those discontented about the relationship with their partner. On the basis of Wills' (1981) postulate that downward comparisons may enhance the subjective well-being in people who experience some kind of threat to their well-being, it was expected that the partner-enhancing downward comparison thought-generating task would more positively affect perceived relationship quality than the no-comparison thought-generating task, particularly when individuals were more discontent with their partner. Finding such a two-way interaction between cognitive set and discontent would confirm Wills' (1981) postulate that downward comparisons enhance subjective well-being especially among people who experience some kind of threat to their well-being. Put differently, cognitive downward comparison might buffer the impact of pretest relational discontent upon posttest relational satisfaction and commitment. Furthermore, we assumed that the effect of cognitive downward comparison would be moderated by social comparison orientation, in such a way that downward comparison would exert a stronger effect upon relationship quality for individuals high in social comparison orientation. More specifically, we expected a three-way interaction indicating that the predicted two-way interaction between cognitive set and discontent would be stronger for individuals having a stronger orientation toward social comparison.
Procedure and Participants
One hundred and sixteen participants who were at the time of the study involved in a relationship (74 married, 24 cohabiting, 18 dating exclusively) participated in the study. The sample included 61 women, and 55 men. The average duration of their relationship was 15.9 years (range 5 months to 52.0 years). Participants were 41.3 years old on average (range 18 to 78 years). All participants received a box of chocolates for their participation.
To obtain a wide range of participants, we recruited a sample of train travellers. As soon as the intercity train left the railway station, a researcher approached potential participants and requested their cooperation in a study on intimate relationships. The cover story was essentially the same as in the fourth study. Participants were asked if they were currently involved in an intimate relationship, and, if so, they were asked to participate in the research. Participants were provided with a booklet containing all measures and the experimental thought-listing task. They were randomly assigned to conditions in which positive qualities of the partner were generated in either noncomparative or in comparative terms.
Premeasures of moderating variables
After providing general demographic information about gender, age, and duration of the relationship, participants answered questions on social comparison orientation and discontent with their partner.
Social Comparison Orientation was measured by the Iowa Netherlands Comparison Orientation Measure (INCOM). This 11-item scale was developed by Gibbons and Buunk (1999) on the basis of a larger item pool, and was tested in more than 25 studies. In Chapter 1 evidence for the predictive validity of the scale was presented, and the most important correlates of the scale were described. In addition, evidence for the construct validity of the scale is provided by the high correlation (r = .66) between this scale and the Attention to Social Comparison Information Scale (Bearden & Rose, 1990). The INCOM does not correlate with social desirability, has in general a reliability > .80, and has a test-retest reliability over eight months of .72.
In an attempt to overcome participant's reluctance in reporting their interest in social comparison information, as outlined above, the instructions for these items in this scale read:
Most people compare themselves from time to time with others. For example, they may compare the way they feel, their opinions, their abilities, and/or their situation with those of other people. There is nothing "good" or "bad" about this type of comparison, and some people do it more than others. We would like to find out how often you compare yourself with other people. To do that, we would like to ask you to indicate how much you agree with each statement.
The measure consists of statements reflecting individual's social comparison activities and interests. Sample items are: "I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have achieved in life", "If I want to learn more about something, I try to find out what others think about it", "I always pay a lot of attention to how I do things compared with how others do things", and "I am not the type of person who compares often with others" (recoded). The items were measured using 5-point scales, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). All ratings were averaged to form a single index, resulting in a INCOM-score with the higher score indicating stronger social comparison orientation (Cronbach's alpha = .77).
Next, participants were asked to consider their feelings of discontentment about the relationship with their partner and to ignore their sexual dissatisfaction. More precisely, participants were asked "Does your life with your partner bring you contentment (putting aside the sexual side)?" Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were discontent with the relationship with their partner on a 9-point scale (1 = completely content and 9 = totally discontent). Higher scores thus indicated higher levels of discontent.
Manipulation of cognitive downward comparison
Next, the experimental part of the booklet consisted of the manipulation of cognitive downward comparison. Most aspects of the procedure were similar to the fourth study. Half of the participants were asked to list all the reasons they could think of why they had good partners (no-comparison condition, n = 60), and half were presented with the question to describe why they had better partners than most others (downward comparison condition, n = 56). All participants were instructed to generate at least five reasons of the specified type they could think of. The rest of the page was left blank except for the lines on which they were asked to write down each new reason. As Study 1 was not a computer-administered experiment, participants could not be instructed to enter the five most important reasons into the computer. Therefore, the next page of the booklet contained the instruction to arrange the listed reasons according to importance, by adding a number to each reason (a 1 for the most important reason, and so on). Participants were instructed to write each number down the left margin.
Dependent Measures
Subsequently, participants responded to questionnaires that tapped the dependent variables. The measures of satisfaction (Cronbach's alpha = .93) and commitment (Cronbach's alpha = .75) were identical to those used in Study 1. Upon completion of the questionnaire, participants were thanked for their time. Instead of debriefing immediately, participants were provided with a postage free response card to request further information regarding the research. On receipt of a response card, a summary of the research findings was forwarded.
Data Analytic Procedure
For descriptive purposes, we examined the mean scores of the study variables in the experimental conditions, as well as the correlations between all study variables. Next, hierarchical moderated regression analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses concerning the extent to which cognitive set predicted participant's levels of relationship satisfaction and commitment, the two-way interactions between cognitive set and discontent with the partner on the one hand, and cognitive set and social comparison orientation on the other hand, and the three-way interaction between cognitive set and the two moderator variables. In Step 1, cognitive set (0 = no-comparison thought-generating task and 1 = downward comparison thought-generating task), discontent with the partner, and social comparison orientation were entered simultaneously. In Step 2, the three two way interaction terms (Cognitive Set X Discontent, Cognitive Set X Comparison Orientation, Discontent X Comparison Orientation) were added to the regression equation. Finally, in Step 3, the three way interaction term (Cognitive Set X Discontent X Comparison Orientation) was entered. To test and interpret these interactions, procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991) were followed to calculate regression slopes and plots. Following Aiken and West, before the interaction terms were calculated, the criterion variables and all continuous predictor variables (i.e., discontent and comparison orientation) were standardized to reduce possible multicollinearity among the independent and interaction terms as well as to facilitate interpretation of the interaction effects. Furthermore, for each continuous predictor, participants with scores one standard deviation above the mean were labelled high social comparison orientation or high discontent with the partner, and those with scores one standard deviation below the mean were labeled low social comparison orientation or low discontent (following Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Where appropriate, significance values concern one tailed tests; two-tailed tests are reported if the direction of the slopes were contrary to the predictions or if no specific predictions were made.
Preliminary Descriptive Analyses
Table 1 presents, separately for participants in the no-comparison and the downward comparison conditions, the means and standard deviations for the variables used in Study 2. Preliminary one-way analyses of variance with cognitive set (no-comparison versus downward comparison) as independent variable indicated that neither the moderator nor the dependent variables were related to cognitive set, Fs < 1, ns. As can be seen from Table 1, the variables measuring relationship quality were significantly correlated. Not surprisingly, especially relationship satisfaction and the moderator variable relational discontent were highly correlated. Furthermore, comparison orientation showed small, but statistically significant relations with the relationship variables.
Regression Analyses
Relationship satisfaction. The main effects of cognitive set, discontent, and social comparison orientation accounted for a significant amount of variance in relationship satisfaction, 
R² = .52, F(3, 112) = 40.37, p < .0001. In contrast to our prediction, the dummy coded term representing cognitive set did not yield a significant effect (B = .03, t(112) = .21, ns). Social comparison orientation (B = .15, t(112) = 2.32, p < .03) and discontent with the partner (B = -.68, t(112) = -10.30, p < .0001) were significantly related to relationship satisfaction, with those high in social comparison orientation and high in discontent experiencing less satisfaction.
TABLE 1
Pearson correlations among variables and means as a function of cognitive set in study 2
| Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | |
| 1. | Satisfaction | -- | ||||
| 2. | Commitment | .63** | -- | |||
| 3. | Discontent | -.70** | -.46** | -- | ||
| 4. | Comparison orientation | -.25* | -.17* | .15 | -- | |
| 5. | Cognitive set | -.03 | .05 | .06 | .03 | -- |
| No-comparison a | 7.64 | 7.48 | 2.35 | 2.96 | -- | |
| (1.39) | (1.24) | (1.35) | (.64) | -- | ||
| Comparison b | 7.56 | 7.60 | 2.52 | 2.99 | -- | |
| (1.14) | (1.07) | (1.45) | (.55) | -- | ||
* p < .05; ** p < .001, one-tailed. Parenthetical values are standard deviations. a N = 56; b N = 60
The two-way interactions entered at the second step yielded a significant incremental amount of explained variance, R² = .07, Fchange(3, 109) = 6.44, p < .001. Neither the predicted Cognitive Set X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = .03, t(109) = .03, ns) nor the Discontent X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = -.04, t(109) = -.03, ns) reached statistical significance, whereas the predicted Cognitive Set X Discontent interaction emerged (B = .53, t(109) = 4.24, p < .0001). Inspection of this interaction revealed that the downward comparison thought-generating task moderated the impact of discontent with the partner than the task in which noncomparative thoughts about the partner were generated: Discontent was less strongly negatively related to relationship satisfaction in the downward comparison condition (B = .43, t(109) = 4.82, p < .001) than in the no-comparison condition (B = -.97, t(109) = 10.80, p < .0001).
However, this interaction was qualified by the expected three-way interaction that accounted for an additional amount of explained variance in relationship satisfaction (B = .35), R² = .02, Fchange(1, 108) = 6.85, p < .02. To clarify the nature of this interaction, the direction of the Cognitive Set X Discontent interactions were calculated in additional regression analyses at low and high levels (1 SD above and below the mean) of social comparison orientation, after which the interaction was plotted following standard procedures (Aiken & West, 1991). As shown in Figure 1, and in line with the predictions, at low levels of social comparison orientation the Cognitive Set X Discontent interaction was not significant (B = .09, t(109) = .44, ns), whereas a significant interaction term was found at high levels of social comparison orientation (B = .78, t(109) = 5.04, p < .0001). The slopes of the standardized form of the equation, and their significance levels were as follows: Among participants low in social comparison orientation, discontent was an equally important predictor of satisfaction in the downward comparison condition (B = -.77, t(108) = 4.53, p < .0001) as well as in the no-comparison condition (B = .86, t(108) = 7.16, p < .0001). In contrast, for those high in social comparison orientation, discontent was less strongly related to satisfaction in the downward comparison condition (B = .27, t(108) = 2.53, p < .02) than in the no-comparison condition (B = -1.05, t(108) = 9.31, p < .0001).
FIGURE 1. Study 2: Regression of relationship satisfaction on discontent about the partner as measured prior to the experimental task within the no-comparison and downward comparison conditions. Relationship satisfaction was regressed on discontent at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of social comparison orientation (INCOM; M = 2.97, SD = .59).
Thus, in line with our prediction, the Cognitive Set X Discontent interaction appeared to be stronger for participants high in social comparison orientation, indicating that cognitive downward comparison led to a relatively better relationship quality among individuals high in discontent only when they were high in social comparison orientation.
Commitment to the relationship. The main effects of cognitive set, discontent, and social comparison orientation accounted for a significant amount of variance in commitment, R² = .23, F(3, 112) = 10.99, p < .0001. The dummy coded term representing cognitive set did not yield a significant effect (B = .16, t(112) = .95, ns). Discontent with the partner was a strongly significant predictor of commitment to the relationship (B = -.45, t(112) = -5.35, p < .0001), indicating that those who were discontent with the relationship with their partner felt less strongly committed to their relationship. Social comparison orientation was not significantly related to commitment (B = -.10, t(112) = -1.21, ns).
The entry of the two-way interactions at the second step did not account for further incremental variance in commitment, R² = .04, Fchange(3, 109) = 2.05, ns. The Discontent X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = -.02, t(109) = -.28, ns) and the predicted Cognitive Set X Comparison Orientation interaction did not approach statistical significance (B = .14, t(109) = .84, ns). However, in line with our prediction, a Cognitive Set X Discontent interaction (B = .37, t(109) = 2.20, p < .02) indicated that downward comparison thought-generating was a more effective moderator of the negative effect of discontent on commitment than the task in which noncomparative thoughts about the partner were generated. Inspection of the two-way interaction revealed that discontent was less strongly negatively related to commitment in the downward comparison condition (B = .27, t(109) = 2.23, p < .02) than in the no-comparison condition (B = -.64, t(109) = 5.34, p < .0001).
As expected, this two-way interaction was qualified by the three-way interaction that accounted for a just significant portion of explained variance in commitment (B = .35), R² = .03, Fchange(1, 108) = 3.83, p =.05. Additional regression analyses were performed to clarify the nature of this interaction in which the direction of the Cognitive Set X Discontent interactions were calculated at low and high levels of social comparison orientation. At low levels of social comparison orientation, the Cognitive Set X Discontent interaction was not significant (B = .077, t(109) = -.27, ns), whereas a significant interaction term was found at high levels of social comparison orientation (B = .62, t(109) = 2.96, p < .005). The slopes of the standardized form of the equation, and their significance levels were calculated to clarify these two-way interactions. As shown in Figure 2, for participants low in social comparison orientation, discontent significantly predicted commitment in both the downward comparison condition (B = -.56, t(108) = 2.43, p < .02), and within the no-comparison condition (B = -.48, t(108) = 2.96, p < .005). In contrast, for those high in social comparison orientation, discontent was not at all associated with commitment in the downward comparison condition (B = -.15, t(108) = 1.05, ns), whereas in the no-comparison condition there was a highly significant association between both variables (B = -.78, t(108) = 5.06, p < .0001). Thus, especially for participants who were strongly inclined to engage in social comparison, cognitive downward comparison contributed to a relatively higher commitment among those experiencing a high discontent with the relationship.
FIGURE 2. Study 2: Regression of commitment to the relationship on discontent about the partner as measured prior to the experimental task within the no-comparison and downward comparison conditions. Commitment was regressed on discontent at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of social comparison orientation (INCOM; M = 2.97, SD = .59).
Supplemental analyses
As in study 1, it was examined again if the number of the qualities generated in both conditions could account for the results. There was no effect of cognitive set, F(1, 114) = .01, ns, upon the number of qualities generated. To determine whether the number of qualities did account for the effects on satisfaction, commitment and perceived relationship quality, the hierarchical moderated regression analyses were repeated after adding the number of the qualities in the first step. In these analyses, all of the major findings were replicated.
The goal of Study 2 was to obtain additional evidence for the hypothesis that cognitive downward comparison may positively affect the perceived quality of the relationship. Moreover, we examined the extent to which the positive effect of downward comparison would occur in particular among individuals who were discontent with the partner and were strongly oriented to engage in social comparison. To examine the generalizability of the findings obtained in Study 1, Study 2 was conducted in a convenience sample of adults who had on average a relationship for more than 15 years.
To summarize, although there was no evidence that cognitive downward comparison exercised a main effect on relationship satisfaction and feelings of commitment to the relationship, a pattern of significant interactions demonstrated that the impact of downward comparison was moderated by discontent with the partner and by social comparison orientation. As we expected, cognitive downward comparisons improved the perceived quality of the relationship especially among people who were discontent with the relationship with their partner. Moreover, this buffering effect of cognitive downward comparison was moderated by social comparison orientation in such a way that only among those high in social comparison orientation was the negative impact of discontent on the perceived quality of the relationship reduced as a result of the downward comparison thought-generating task. Also in accordance with the findings of Study 1, the number of the qualities generated did not differ between both conditions, thus suggesting that our findings were not artifacts of the number of qualities but that they were due to the effects of downward comparison. As a whole, the present findings suggest that even among individuals who had on average a relationship that had lasted over 15 years, cognitive downward comparison may help in maintaining a relative positive evaluation of one's relationship when experiencing relational discontent.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that one possible limitation of the results of Study 2 is that the main effect of cognitive set on perceived relationship quality was not replicated. The absence of an improvement in perceived quality of the relationship may be due to the fact that the pretest measures (i.e., social comparison orientation and discontent with the partner) and the dependent variables were assessed in the same session. The pretest measures may thus have influenced the subsequent dependent measures that were administered, known as "carryover" effects (see, for instance, Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Additional limitations of Study 2 are that there was little control of the experimental situation, and that discontent was measured by only one item asking participants to indicate the degree to which they were discontent with the relationship with their partner. Therefore, a laboratory experiment was conducted to address these limitations and to further corroborate the findings of Studies 1 and 2.
In general, Study 3 was highly similar to Studies 1 and 2, except for a few modifications. First, in an effort to reduce possible carryover effects the pretest of relational discontent and comparison orientation were administered approximately four weeks prior to the experimental part of the research and the measurement of the dependent variables. Second, the pretest measure of discontent was expanded to include some additional items measuring discontent with the relationship. Third, as the two previous studies could not test the assumption that cognitive downward comparisons enhanced perceived relationship quality, Study 3 examined if satisfaction and commitment did indeed increase due to cognitive downward comparison by including pretest measures of satisfaction and commitment. Fourth, in addition to the measures of general relationship satisfaction and commitment to the relationship, an additional dependent variable was employed that asked participants to evaluate the overall quality of their relationship by placing a mark on a graphic line. We assumed this to be a more sensitive measure of perceived relationship quality than the general measures of relationship satisfaction and commitment. Fifth, as in Study 1, response latencies as an unobtrusive measure of relational satisfaction were also assessed. Sixth, because we wanted to examine the effects of cognitive downward comparison on the global evaluation of the relationship, we examined the effect of relationship-enhancement instead of partner-enhancement on perceived relationship quality. The thought-generating task thus manipulated relationship-enhancing downward comparisons by asking participants to generate reasons why they considered their own relationship to be a good relationship or a better relationship than that of most others. In conclusion, the predictions were identical to those in Study 2.
Procedure and Participants
Approximately 2 months before scheduling the experimental sessions in the laboratory, participants were recruited via electronic mail, which asked for undergraduates to participate in a study about relationships. The cover story was essentially the same as in the fourth study. It was mentioned that interested participants were eligible to participate in the study if they were involved in an intimate relationship for at least the previous 3 months.
Two hundred and eight potential participants responded via electronic mail. Potential participants were sent questionnaires by mail, together with a postage-paid return envelope and a cover letter that thanked them for participation in the research. They were asked to complete the questionnaire individually and to answer all questions sequentially. A reminder letter was sent to those participants who did not return the questionnaires within two weeks. Following this procedure, 166 participants returned completed questionnaires, yielding a response rate of 78%. They were asked to supply their names and telephone numbers so that they could be contacted at a later date. A financial incentive of 5 Dutch Guilders (approximately U.S. $3) was offered if they completed and returned the questionnaire.
Approximately 3 to 5 weeks after returning the questionnaires, one hundred and eighteen participants could be contacted by telephone and a time was arranged for them to come to the laboratory. One hundred and twelve participants showed up for their scheduled follow-up session in the laboratory. Two participants reported that they were no longer involved in relationships with their original partners and were dropped from the sample. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 110 University of Groningen undergraduates (74 women, and 36 men). Ninety-four were involved in dating relationships, 14 participants were cohabiting, and 2 were married. The average duration of their relationship was 2.0 years, with a range of 3 months to 8.4 years. Participants were 21.8 years old on average (range 18 to 29 years). All participants were paid 7.5 Dutch guilders (approximately U.S. $4.5) for their participation in the laboratory research.
Premeasures of moderating variables and criteria variables
The questionnaire was designed to assess social comparison orientation, initial levels of relational discontent, and prior levels of relationship satisfaction and commitment to the relationship. The INCOM (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) was used to measure social comparison orientation (Cronbach's alpha = .83). Subsequently, a 7-item self-report scale was constructed to assess relational discontent. The items were found to load on a single factor and the reliability of the composite was high (Cronbach's alpha = .82). Participants indicated, on 9-point scales, the extent to which they were discontent with their relationship, as well as the extent to which they had been bothered or distressed by the course of events in their relationships during the past two months. The scale included, among others, the single item used in Study 2 to assess discontent with their partner (1 = completely content and 9 = totally discontent). In addition, the scale included items such as "Have you or your partner seriously discussed the idea of ending the relationship during the past weeks?" (1 = not at all and 9 = very frequently), "Do you feel that your relationship is under a lot of pressure due to unresolved differences of opinion between you and your partner?" (1 = no pressure at all and 9 = a lot of pressure), and "Do you feel that you don't know were you stand in your relationship with your partner?" (1 = completely disagree and 9 = completely agree).
In addition, prior levels of the dependent variables were assessed. Thus participants completed measures of satisfaction (Cronbach's alpha = .92) and commitment (Cronbach's alpha = .85) that were identical to those used in Studies 1 and 2, and were asked to evaluate the overall quality of their relationship by placing a mark on a 100-millimeters line, anchored at zero with "extremely low quality," and at 100 with "extremely high quality." The distance measured in millimeters from the left end of the line was assessed to measure perceived quality of the relationship, resulting in a nearly continuous measure.
Laboratory protocol
In the laboratory, the procedure was identical to Study 1, with the exception that, instead of manipulating self- and partner-enhancing downward comparison, participants in this experiment were instructed to focus on the qualities of their relationship which they considered as good or as superior to other relationships. The experimenters were unaware of participants' relational discontent levels and comparison orientation throughout the experimental procedure, and assignment to the no-comparison (n = 55) versus downward comparison condition (n = 55) was randomly determined.
On each table, the experimenter had placed an envelope. The participants were told that the envelope contained test materials and that they had to start with the computer-administered procedure by pressing a key, following the instructions. They were asked to work their way through the program at their own pace and to refer to the envelope when they were requested, to complete the questionnaire it contained. Each individual was then led to an individual booth and seated in front of a microcomputer.
Dependent Measures
After completing the thought-generating task, participants were presented with the dependent measures, that is the measures of satisfaction and commitment that were the same as in the pretest (Cronbach's alphas = .95 and .87, respectively), including the 100-millimeters measure of perceived quality of the relationship that was administered as a paper-and-pencil question. The questions of satisfaction and commitment were answered by pressing a numerical key (1 through 9) on the keyboard of the computer. Next, participants were instructed to open the envelope and complete the paper-and-pencil question. The response latencies to the questionnaires of satisfaction and commitment, as well as baseline response times, were recorded following the same procedure as in Study 1.
Data Analytic Procedure
Analytical procedures were identical to those employed in Study 2. We first examined the mean scores of the study variables in the experimental conditions, as well as the correlations between all study variables. Next, the dependent variables at Time 2 were included in hierarchical moderated regression analyses.
Preliminary Descriptive Analyses
Means and standard deviations of all study variables are displayed in Table 2. One-way analyses of variance with cognitive set (no-comparison versus downward comparison) as independent variable indicated no initial differences between both conditions on the criteria variables, Fs < 1.47, ns, although participants in the downward comparison condition reported marginally less discontent at Time 1 than those in the no-comparison condition, F(1, 108) = 3.48, p = .07.5 No difference was found in social comparison orientation, F < 1, ns. However, in accordance with our prediction, cognitive set significantly or marginally significantly influenced the dependent variables at Time 2. As the means in Table 2 indicate, participants in the comparison condition reported more satisfaction, F(1, 108) = 3.59, p = .06, commitment, F(1, 108) = 4.17, p < .05, and a higher quality of the relationship, F(1, 108) = 3.73, p = .06, than participants assigned to the no-comparison condition.
TABLE 2
Means for study variables as a function of cognitive set in study 3
| No-Comparisona | No-Comparisonb | |||
| Variable | M | SD | M | SD |
| Preexperimental (Time 1) | ||||
| Discontent | 2.97 | 1.27 | 2.51 | 1.29 |
| Comparison orientation | 3.37 | .64 | 3.44 | .65 |
| Satisfaction | 7.43 | 1.15 | 7.54 | 1.05 |
| Commitment | 7.03 | 1.48 | 7.35 | 1.28 |
| Relationship Quality | 77.35 | 13.74 | 79.44 | 14.4 |
| Postexperimental (Time 2) | ||||
| Satisfaction | 7.25 | 1.39 | 7.68 | 1.00 |
| Commitment | 6.97 | 1.50 | 7.50 | 1.22 |
| Relationship Quality | 76.33 | 15.41 | 81.47 | 12.37 |
a N = 55
b N = 55
Furthermore, the dependent variables were submitted to two-way ANOVAs with Cognitive Set as a between-subjects variable, and Time (Time 1 versus Time 2) as a repeated-measure variable to test the prediction that the downward comparison thought-generating task would exert a more positive influence on perceived relationship quality than the no-comparison thought-generating task. The ANOVAs revealed a significant interaction between cognitive set and time on satisfaction, F(1, 108) = 5.25, p < .03, and marginally significant interactions on commitment, F(1, 108) = 2.57, p = .11, and relationship quality, F(1, 108) = 2.75, p = .10. Next, t-tests (one-tailed) were performed to test the differences between Time 1 and Time 2 levels of the dependent variables. Relative to prior levels of satisfaction, participants in the no-comparison thought-generating task displayed significantly less satisfaction, t(54) = -1.80, p < .04, whereas participants displayed marginally more satisfaction following the downward comparison thought-generating task, t(54) = 1.43, p < .08. In addition, whereas prior levels of commitment and relationship quality did not differ from levels reported following the no-comparison task, ts(54) = -.55 and -.71, ns, participants reported significantly more commitment and higher relationship quality in the downward comparison condition, ts(54) = 1.98 and 1.76, ps < .03 and .04. In sum, whereas the two previous experiments could not test the assumption that cognitive downward comparisons enhanced perceived relationship quality, these findings offer evidence that the downward comparison thought-generating task resulted in an increase in relationship quality whereas the no-comparison thought-generating task did not affect relationship quality.
Finally, as can be seen in Table 3, the variables measuring relationship quality were significantly correlated. Not surprisingly, relational discontent was highly correlated with the measures of relationship quality. Comparison orientation showed small, but mostly statistically significant relations with the relationship variables.
Regression Analyses
Relationship satisfaction. The main effects of cognitive set, relational discontent, and social comparison orientation accounted for a significant amount of variance in satisfaction, R² = .59, F(3, 106) = 51.44, p < .0001. The dummy coded term representing cognitive set did not yield a significant effect (B = .08, t(106) = .67, ns). Relational discontent (B = -.77, t(106) = -11.70, p < .0001) was negatively and significantly related to satisfaction, whereas social comparison orientation did not yield a significant predictor (B = .03, t(106) = .43, ns). The two-way interactions entered at the second step yielded a nonsignificant incremental amount of explained variance, R² = .02, Fchange(3, 103) = 1.97, ns. Neither the Cognitive Set X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = -.04, t(103) = .33, ns), nor the predicted Relational Discontent X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = .06, t(103) = .81, ns) reached statistical significance. However, the predicted Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction emerged (B = .27, t(103) = 2.06, p < .05). Inspection of this interaction revealed that comparative thought-generating was a more effective buffer against relational discontent than the task in which noncomparative thoughts about the partner were generated: Relational Discontent was less strongly predictive of satisfaction in the downward comparison condition (B = .66, t(103) = 6.81, p < .0001) than in the no-comparison condition (B = -.93, t(103) = 9.81, p < .0001).
TABLE 3
Pearson correlations among variables in study 3
| Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 1. Cognitive Set | -- | ||||||||
| 2. Discontent | -.18* | -- | |||||||
| 3. Comparison Orientation | .06 | .27** | -- | ||||||
| 4. Satisfaction-T1 | .05 | -.77** | -.13 | -- | |||||
| 5. Commitment-T1 | .12 | -.62** | -.15 | .71** | -- | ||||
| 6. Relationship Quality-T1 | .07 | -.69** | -.22* | .72** | .61** | -- | |||
| 7. Satisfaction_T2 | .18* | -.77** | -.18* | .79** | .78** | .73** | -- | ||
| 8. Commitment-T2 | .19* | -.61** | -.23** | .65** | .87** | .67** | .84** | -- | |
| 9. Relationship Quality-T2 | .18** | -.68** | -.27** | .67** | .73** | .76** | .81** | .78** | -- |
* p < .05; ** p < .001, one-tailed.
However, this interaction was subsumed by the expected three-way interaction that accounted for an additional amount of variance in relationship satisfaction (B = .30), R² = .02, Fchange(1, 102) = 4.71, p < .04. To clarify the nature of the three-way interaction, the direction of the Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interactions were calculated in additional regression analyses at low and high levels of social comparison orientation. The Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction was significant at high (B = .47, t(102) = 2.96, p < .01), but not at low levels of social comparison orientation (B = -.13, t(102) = -.56, ns). As shown in Figure 3, the three-way interaction is similar to that found in Study 2. Inspection of the slopes of the standardized form of the equation revealed that the relation between discontent and satisfaction was significant and negative in all conditions. For those low in social comparison orientation, discontent and satisfaction were significant related following the downward comparison thought-generating task (B = -.96, t(102) = 5.40, p < .0001), and following the no comparison task (B = .83, t(102) = 5.92, p < .0001). Among participants high in social comparison orientation, however, this negative association was more pronounced in the no-comparison condition (B = -1.00, t(102) = 8.02, p < .0001) than in the downward comparison condition (B = -.52, t(102) = 5.24, p < .0001). Thus, in line with our prediction, the Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction appeared to be stronger as participants were to a greater extent oriented toward social comparison.
FIGURE 3. Study 3: Regression of relationship satisfaction on relational discontent as measured prior to the experimental task within the no-comparison and downward comparison conditions. Relationship satisfaction was regressed on discontent at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of social comparison orientation (INCOM; M = 3.41, SD = .64).
Commitment to the relationship. The main effects of cognitive set, relational discontent, and social comparison orientation accounted for a significant amount of variance in commitment, R² = .38, F(3, 106) = 10.99, p < .0001. This main effect resulted mainly from relational discontent which significantly predicted feelings of commitment (B = -.77, t(106) = -11.70, p < .0001). The dummy coded term representing cognitive set did not yield a significant effect (B = .19, t(106) = 1.24, ns). Likewise, social comparison orientation was not significantly related to commitment (B = -.10, t(112) = -1.21, p < .23).
Entering the two-way interactions at the second step did not account for further incremental variance in commitment, R² = .02, Fchange(3, 103) = 1.0, ns. Neither the predicted Relational Discontent X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = .14, t(103) = 1.59, ns), nor the Cognitive Set X Comparison Orientation interaction was statistically significant (B = .09, t(106) = .45, ns). However, as predicted, a Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction emerged (B = .37, t(109) = 2.20, p < .02). Inspection of this interaction revealed that downward comparison thought-generating was a more effective buffer against the negative effect of relational discontent on commitment than the task in which noncomparative thoughts about the partner were generated: Discontent was less strongly negatively related to commitment in the downward comparison condition (B = .27, t(109) = 2.23, p < .02) than in the no-comparison condition (B = -.64, t(109) = 5.34, p < .0001).
As for satisfaction, this two-way interaction was qualified by the predicted three-way interaction that accounted for a significant portion of explained variance in commitment (B = .50), R² = .05, Fchange(1, 102) = 8.64, p < .01. Additional regression analyses revealed that social comparison orientation moderated the Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction, indicating that the two-way interaction at high levels of comparison orientation (B = .42, t(102) = 2.16, p < .04) was opposite to the interaction at low levels of comparison orientation (B = .57, t(102) = -2.06, p < .05). To further clarify these interactions, the slopes of the standardized form of the equation were calculated. As shown in Figure 4, at low levels of social comparison orientation, discontent was a stronger predictor of commitment in the downward comparison condition (B = -1.11, t(102) = 5.14, p < .0001) than within the no-comparison condition (B = -.54, t(102) = 3.16, p < .01). In contrast, at high levels of social comparison orientation, commitment was less strongly predicted by discontent for participants within the downward comparison condition (B = -.30, t(102) = 2.49, p < .02) than in the no-comparison condition (B = -.73, t(102) = 4.77, p < .0001). Thus, as expected, cognitive downward comparison improved the commitment of participants faced with relational discontent particularly among those strongly oriented toward social comparison. Conversely, at low levels of social comparison orientation, the interaction appeared to be in the opposite direction, so that discontent was more strongly negatively related to commitment in the downward comparison than in the no-comparison condition.
FIGURE 4. Study 3: Regression of commitment to the relationship on relational discontent as measured prior to the experimental task within the no-comparison and downward comparison conditions. Commitment was regressed on discontent at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of social comparison orientation (INCOM; M = 3.41, SD = .64).
Perceived relationship quality. The main effects of cognitive set, relational discontent, and social comparison orientation accounted for a significant amount of variance in perceived quality of the relationship, R² = .47, F(3, 106) = 31.42, p < .0001. Relational discontent appeared to be the most powerful predictor of relationship quality (B = -.64, t(106) = -8.50, p < .0001). The dummy coded term representing cognitive set did not yield a significant effect (B = .15, t(106) = 1.05, ns), nor did social comparison orientation (B = -.10, t(106) = -1.34, ns). The two-way interactions entered at the second step yielded a nonsignificant incremental amount of explained variance, R² = .01, Fchange(3, 103) = .54, ns. Neither the Cognitive Set X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = .05, t(103) = .32, ns), nor the predicted Relational Discontent X Comparison Orientation interaction (B = .02, t(103) = .27, ns) and the predicted Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction reached statistical significance (B = .16, t(103) = 1.00, ns).
However, the three-way interaction accounted for an additional proportion of explained variance in perceived quality of the relationship (B = .68), R² = .09, Fchange(1, 102) = 20.52, p < .0001. In additional regression analyses at low and high levels of social comparison orientation, the nature of the three-way interaction was examined. As shown in Figure 5, the Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction at high levels of comparison orientation (B = .61, t(102) = 3.49, p < .001) was opposite to the interaction at low levels of comparison orientation (B = .75, t(102) = -3.07, p < .01). The slopes of the standardized form of the equation, and their significance levels were calculated to clarify these two-way interactions. As shown in Figure 5, relational discontent was negatively related to relationship quality. Among participants low in social comparison orientation, discontent was a more powerful predictor of perceived relationship quality in the downward comparison condition (B = -1.15, t(102) = 5.95, p < .0001) than in the no-comparison condition (B = -.39, t(102) = 2.57, p < .02). In contrast, for those high in social comparison orientation, relationship quality was less strongly predicted by relational discontent following the downward comparison thought-generating task (B = -.37, t(102) = 3.43, p < .001) than following the no-comparison task (B = .98, t(102) = 7.24, p < .0001). Thus, in line with our prediction, the Cognitive Set X Relational Discontent interaction appeared to be stronger as participants were to a greater extent oriented toward social comparison. Put differently, for those high in social comparison orientation, engaging in cognitive social comparison when faced with relational discontent made one relatively less dissatisfied with the relationship.
FIGURE 5. Study 3: Regression of perceived quality of the relationship on relational discontent as measured prior to the experimental task within the no-comparison and downward comparison conditions. Perceived relationship quality was regressed on discontent at low (1 SD below the mean) and high (1 SD above the mean) levels of social comparison orientation (INCOM; M = 3.41, SD = .64).
Analyses of the Response Latencies
To assess the effects of cognitive set on the response times we followed the same analytical strategy as in Study 1. Although the analyses were performed on the transformed latencies, for clarity we present the retransformed scores. The transformed response latencies were submitted to one-way analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs), with the baseline index for response time as a covariate.&sup6; In line with the reported effects in Study 1, a main effect emerged of cognitive set on the latency index of satisfaction. Participants in the comparison condition responded faster to the scales of relationships satisfaction, F(1, 89) = 4.96, p < .03, than participants assigned to the no-comparison thought-generating task. As predicted, the mean latencies (adjusted for individual differences in response latencies) in the comparison condition and in the no-comparison condition were 7.94 versus 8.74. Although the mean latencies to the commitment index were shorter in the comparison condition (9.06) than in the no-comparison condition (9.31), the difference in response latencies did not reach conventional levels of significance, F < 1, ns. Furthermore, to explore the interaction effects of cognitive set, relational discontent, and comparison orientation on the latency indexes, we followed the same regression analytical strategy as for the self-report measures of relationship quality. The hierarchical moderated regression analyses did not qualify the reported main effect on the satisfaction latency index, nor did any interaction effects on the commitment latency index approach statistical significance. To summarize briefly, the main effect on the satisfaction latency index due to type of cognitive set replicated the results of Study 1, suggesting that cognitive downward comparison increases especially the accessibility of the attitude toward relationship satisfaction.
Supplemental analyses
As noted in the previous studies, possible alternative explanations of the obtained findings required additional analyses. First, it was examined if the number of qualities generated in both conditions could account for the results. There was no effect of cognitive set, F(1, 108) = .55, ns, upon the number of qualities generated. When controlling for the number of qualities, all of the major analyses were replicated.
Unlike in Study 1, in Study 3 the participants did not rate the positivity of the qualities they generated. However, the qualities listed in the comparison and in the no-comparison condition were rated by two independent judges on 5-point scales ranging from very negative to very positive. The judges were blind to hypothesis and experimental conditions, and the interrater agreement was high, as indicated by a Cohen's Kappa of .96.
First, an analysis of variance revealed that the two judges did rate the qualities in the comparison condition a little more positively (M = 4.16) than those generated in the no-comparison condition (M = 4.10), but the difference between both conditions was not statistically reliable, F (1, 109) = 3.37, p = .07. Secondly, regression analyses failed to find any effects of relational discontent (B = .14, ns) and social comparison orientation (B = -.09, ns) on the positivity of the generated qualities. Further, the hierarchical moderated regression analyses were repeated after adding the positivity ratings of the qualities in the first step. Again, after controlling for the positivity of the generated qualities, all of the major analyses were replicated. Thus, these regression analyses do not support the alternative account that the findings are due to the greater positivity of the qualities listed in the comparison condition relative to the qualities that were generated by the participants in the no-comparison condition.
5. In the hierarchical moderated regression analyses prior levels of discontent was entered simultaneously with cognitive set and social comparison orientation in Step 1 so that the regression statistics explain prediction of T2 criteria by the predictor variables and their product terms independent of prior relational distress. Therefore, the marginally significant difference of discontent between the downward and the no-comparison conditions at Time 1 is not discussed further.
6. Before performing the analyses of covariance, preliminary analyses confirmed that the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes within both conditions was upheld.
Study 3 replicated the findings of the first study that cognitive downward comparison positively affects the self-report measures of satisfaction and commitment. In line with this main effect of cognitive set, downward comparison also led to an improvement in the additional measure of perceived quality of the relationship. Moreover, controlling for positivity of qualities listed in the thought-listing task failed to eliminate the findings, thus ruling out the possible alternative line of reasoning that the differential valence of the qualities listed in both experimental conditions might account for the obtained effects. Additionally, participants in the downward comparison condition also showed lower response latencies to the satisfaction questionnaire than those in the no-comparison conditions, thus reflecting a more accessible and favorable evaluation of the relationship in the former condition.
Somewhat unexpectedly, whereas in Study 1 type of cognitive set yielded effects on the response latencies of both indexes of satisfaction and commitment, the experimental manipulations in this third study did not influence the accessibility of the feelings of commitment to the relationship. Notwithstanding this observation, Study 3 provides evidence that cognitive downward comparison positively affects both the self-report measures of perceived relationship quality and led to lower response latencies on the index of satisfaction, thus underlining the higher level of satisfaction in the downward comparison condition as compared to the no-downward comparison condition.
Moreover, the results of Study 3 replicate and extend the findings of Study 2 to a sample of undergraduate students. In both studies, actively engaging in cognitive downward comparison positively affected indices of relationship quality especially when participants reported discontent about their relationship, and this effect of downward comparison was more pronounced for individuals high in social comparison orientation.
While social comparison research has traditionally focussed particularly upon factors affecting individuals' comparison desires and choice of a comparison target, in the past decade the attention has shifted to the consequences of social comparison for mood, well-being and satisfaction. A number of studies have provided evidence for the relation between downward comparison and general well-being, and it has been clearly demonstrated that feeling better off than others on a specific dimension is related to satisfaction with one's standing on that dimension (for reviews, see Buunk, 1994; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wills, 1981). Although many studies on this issue have been correlational, thus impeding causal conclusions, in an increasing number of laboratory experiments the effects of social comparison information have been examined (e.g., Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Klein, 1997; Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995). The usual paradigm in this area, however, consists of a procedure in which researchers provide participants with social comparison information after which the impact of this information is assessed (for reviews, see Wood, 1989, 1996). Characteristic of this type of paradigm is that participants are passive recipients of social comparison information.
Hence, to examine experimentally whether cognitive downward comparison improves perceived relationship quality, the current research extended the existing literature by applying a new paradigm that induced participants to actively engage in cognitive downward social comparison. Furthermore, since the effects of social comparison have scarcely been studied in the domain of intimate relationships, we sought to extend previous research on social comparison in intimate relationships, and to provide insight into the effects of cognitive downward social comparison on relationship satisfaction.
The experimental paradigm was a thought-generating task which asked participants to generate positive qualities in which they consider themselves, their intimate partners, or their own relationships in noncomparative or comparative terms. This paradigm was designed to test the prediction that relationship quality is not so much positively affected by noncomparative evaluations in terms of good but instead by the belief that one's own situation is better than that of most others (cf. Emmons & Diener, 1985; Klein, 1997). Cognitive downward comparison was expected to be a particularly successful strategy for people who experience problems in their relationship to reevaluate their situation and to make them feel relatively more satisfied with their relationship. Furthermore, we expected that downward comparison would exert a stronger buffering effect for individuals high in social comparison orientation. We examined this model in both laboratory and field studies, testing our hypotheses in samples of undergraduates as well as in a non-student sample of individuals who had been in relationships for a relatively longer period of time.
The current series of studies clearly indicated that cognitive downward comparison can have beneficial effects on the development and maintenance of relationship quality (i.e., global, evaluative judgments of the relationship; cf. Fincham & Bradbury, 1987). Study 1 demonstrated that participants who were induced to engage in self- and partner-enhancing cognitive downward comparison experienced more relationship satisfaction and felt more committed to their relationship than participants who were asked to generate noncomparative self- and partner-evaluations. Consistent with the theoretical model, Study 2 demonstrated that preexperimentally identified levels of relational discontent and individual differences in social comparison orientation moderated the effects of cognitive downward comparison: under high relational discontent, partner-enhancing downward comparisons lead to more satisfaction and commitment, particularly when individuals were dispositionally strongly inclined to compare their own circumstances with those of others. In addition, Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 in a sample of undergraduate students. Relational discontent and comparison orientation as measured approximately four weeks prior to the experimental sessions in the laboratory moderated the relationship-enhancing effects of cognitive downward comparison. In both Studies 2 and 3, the negative impact of discontent regarding the relationship with the partner on individuals' relationship quality was buffered by comparison of one's own relationship with other relationships of inferior quality, particularly among those who were high in social comparison orientation.
At least two alternative interpretations of the differential effects of the thought-generating tasks are possible. First, a potential limitation of the current research concerns the self-reporting nature of most of the measures. Therefore, it is conceivable that the beneficial effect of the downward comparison thought-generating task is simply a result of demand characteristics and that the effects do not represent any real improvements in perceived quality of the relationship. That is, participants might have concluded from the thought-generating task that they were supposed to think "good" or "exceptional", and that they should continue in the same manner in answering the subsequent questions (cf. Bless, Strack, & Schwarz, 1993; Schwarz, 1994). Of course, the problem with this interpretation is that it cannot explain why only generating qualities in which one's relationship was superior, and not generating qualities in which one's relationship was good resulted under certain conditions in increased satisfaction. Nevertheless, to rule out the possibility of demand characteristics, in Studies 1 and 3 we measured perceived quality of the relationship by both self-report measures and unobtrusive response latencies measures of which the participants were unaware. In these studies, as we hypothesized, cognitive downward comparison influenced the unobtrusive measures of response latencies (although the response latencies to the commitment index in Study 3 did not reveal acceptable levels of significance, they followed the predicted pattern). That is, the heightened salience of superior relationship qualities seemed to have resulted in increased levels of relationship satisfaction which, consequently, led to increased accessibility of the attitude toward the relationship. This effect of the downward comparison thought-generating task on the response latencies of the dependent variables underlines the strengths of our findings.
A second plausible artifactual explanation is the possibility that the comparison thought-listing task induced participants to list qualities that were more positive than the qualities generated in the no-comparison thought-listing task. That is, the obtained effects might not be due to the fact that participants actively engaged in downward social comparison but to the fact that they generated qualities in the comparison condition that differed in valence from those in the no-comparison condition. However, controlling for positivity of the qualities did not eliminate the effects of the experimental manipulation of cognitive downward comparison. These supplemental analyses speak to the validity of the experimental manipulation and suggest that it is cognitive downward comparison that accounts for the obtained effects in the current series of studies.
Considered as a whole, the present findings indicate that people may enhance their well-being through a downward social comparison process when they are unhappy about the relationship with their partner. The results of these three studies are consistent with Wills' downward comparison theory (1981, 1987) and selective evaluation theory proposed by Taylor et al. (1983) that would predict that when people experience relational discontent, selective evaluation through downward comparison may make individuals feel relatively better about their relationship.
Also, the present research may have methodological implications for the social comparison literature. The use of a thought-generating paradigm to induce active cognitive downward comparison is to the best of our knowledge new to the social comparison literature. That is, participants were not presented with social comparison information from an outside source, but an active, cognitive downward comparison process was induced. As such, the thought-listing task which asked participants to list positive qualities in noncomparative or comparative terms may offer a useful paradigm to examine experimentally the possible beneficial consequences of cognitive downward social comparisons for individuals' psychological well-being.
In addition to these methodological implications, the present research also has a number of potentially important theoretical implications for social comparison research. Not only does the present research clarify how cognitive downward comparisons may affect the way individuals evaluate their situation, the present research is also one of the first to provide direct evidence that there are meaningful individual differences in social comparison orientation. Although various authors have suggested that individuals differ in their tendency to compare themselves with others (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977), there is virtually no research that has addressed this issue, and shown that individual differences in this regard lead to different responses to social comparison. The orientation assessed by the scale developed by Gibbons and Buunk (1999) indeed appears directly relevant with respect to the impact of social comparison. Studies 2 and 3 clearly showed that cognitive downward comparison buffered the effect of discontent with the relationship upon relationship evaluation only for individuals high in social comparison orientation. These findings seem to qualify our knowledge about the beneficial consequences of downward comparison as such consequences are only found concerning individuals who are dispositionally strongly inclined to compare themselves with others. Apparently, the buffering role of downward comparison as proposed by Wills (1981), may not be as general a phenomenon as sometimes supposed.
To the best of our knowledge, although theorists have speculated for decades about the impact of social comparisons upon relationship satisfaction (e.g., Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), there exists scarcely any prior research demonstrating that the perceived quality of an intimate relationship can be influenced experimentally by social comparison, thus impeding the development of causal models involving relationship quality. Therefore, the current work may contribute to a better understanding of the maintenance and enhancement of relationship quality by demonstrating the beneficial effects of cognitive downward comparison on the perceived quality of the relationship, especially for those who experience discontent with the relationship with their partners and consequently suffer a decline in the quality of their relationship. The fact that downward comparison has more effect among individuals who have a dispositional tendency to engage in social comparison suggests that for individuals with a low social comparison orientation other processes are more important for relationship satisfaction.