Although some researchers (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Hemphill & Lehman, 1991; Wills, 1981, 1991b) have suggested the potential existence of normative sanctions against engaging in social comparison, past social comparison research has devoted little attention to the reactions to publicly conveyed social comparisons. In an attempt to approach this void, three studies were reported in the current chapter that presented participants with a short fragment supposedly derived from a group discussion wherein someone publicly evaluated his or her close relationship in either an enhancing and a deprecating (Studies 4 and 5), or in a comparative and a noncomparative (Study 6) manner.

The three studies document the reactions to others engaging in downward social comparison by demonstrating that, relative to self-enhancement, people seem to consider others' partner-enhancement more socially desirable. Furthermore, someone who publicly evaluates his or her partner in a partner-enhancing fashion evoked in the observers of such downward comparison activities more positive and less negative feelings than someone displaying self-enhancing downward comparisons. In contrast, people expressed less appreciation for others' partner-deprecating evaluations than for others evaluating the self as a partner in a denigrating manner.

Even though the data in Studies 5 and 6 are correlational and cannot be used to establish causal relations between the dependent variables, the pattern of results suggests that the differences may be mediated by feelings of sympathy for the discussant. That is, the data suggest that when people read the statements, they are for instance, confronted with someone who publicly boasts that his or her own relationship is superior to that of others, which may imply an inferior standing of the relationship of others. In response to these boastful statements, observers of such statements may feel criticized and feel antipathy for the discussant.

This is in line with Brickman and Bulman's (1977; see also Smith, 1994; Tesser et al., 1988) line of reasoning, namely that people might suffer by comparison when someone else is claiming his or her own superiority over other people, thereby implying that those others are regarded as less fortunate due to their inferior status. Further, the person of inferior status may feel bad about him- or herself, and may develop negative feelings for the superior person. Hence, Brickman and Bulman (1977, p. 153) suggested that "norms grow up that restrict or prohibit social comparison, even at the cost of depriving people of interesting and potentially valuable information," and that little sympathy will be felt for someone who violates this norm, which is typically the case when somebody publicly engages in self-enhancing social comparison.

The findings of the current studies may help us understand more clearly why some individuals state that they do not engage in social comparison. As noted previously, participants in social comparison research frequently display a resistance to questions that ask them to evaluate themselves in comparison to other persons. The current series of studies suggest that one possible reason for this resistance may be that people anticipate potential disapproval of their social comparison activities by those others who are involved in the process of comparison, especially when the social comparison implies that those others are worse off.

Another line of reasoning assumes that people admit their social comparison activities with reserve due to individual differences in orientation toward social comparison. In an extensive research program on the personality disposition to engage in social comparison, Gibbons and Buunk (1999) demonstrated that this disposition was associated with a variety of social comparison behaviors.

However, in Study 6, individuals' reactions to someone else engaging in social comparison were not moderated by individual differences in recipients' orientation toward social comparison. Apparently, individuals' orientation toward social comparison do not affect their response to social comparison activities of other people. In Chapter 2, a series of studies is reported which examined whether the consequences of cognitive downward comparison was moderated by social comparison orientation. In two studies, participants were not passive recipients of social comparison information, but were induced to actively engage in social comparison themselves.

In conclusion, the findings reported here suggest that presenting one's partner in a favorable manner may prove a relatively acceptable and effective way to enhance and maintain a positive image of the self, the partner, and the relationship. That is, people's public image is better off when they state that they engage in partner, rather than in self-enhancement, especially when they take the opportunity to make social comparisons to worse-off others. As researchers continue to examine the ways in which people engage in social comparison, future research will need to explore the ways in which research on social comparison is impeded by individuals' reluctance to provide accounts of their social comparison activities.