Although the findings of Study 1 have both theoretical and methodological strengths, it is limited in that it examined the short-term involvements of undergraduates. Therefore, to ensure external validity and applied value of our findings, a major purpose of the second study was to replicate the findings from Study 1 in a non-student sample of individuals who had been in relationships for a long period of time. In this study, the self-enhancing conditions were omitted and the manipulation of cognitive downward comparison consisted of a thought-generating task in which participants were asked to evaluate their intimate partner in comparative or noncomparative terms. This was undertaken for three reasons.

First, Study 1 did not yield differential effects for self- and partner-enhancement; secondly, despite the absence of differential effects on relationship quality, it was assumed (see Chapter 3 of the present thesis) that self-enhancement was considered more socially undesirable than partner-enhancement, thus raising the possibility that participants may experience difficulties with questions that ask them to evaluate themselves against other persons. Thirdly, we assume that people remain in their relationships because of the qualities of the partner rather than because of their own qualities as a partner.

Another goal of Study 2 was to determine whether the effect of cognitive downward comparison on the perceived quality of the relationship specifically occurred for those discontented about the relationship with their partner. On the basis of Wills' (1981) postulate that downward comparisons may enhance the subjective well-being in people who experience some kind of threat to their well-being, it was expected that the partner-enhancing downward comparison thought-generating task would more positively affect perceived relationship quality than the no-comparison thought-generating task, particularly when individuals were more discontent with their partner.

Finding such a two-way interaction between cognitive set and discontent would confirm Wills' (1981) postulate that downward comparisons enhance subjective well-being especially among people who experience some kind of threat to their well-being. Put differently, cognitive downward comparison might buffer the impact of pretest relational discontent upon posttest relational satisfaction and commitment. Furthermore, we assumed that the effect of cognitive downward comparison would be moderated by social comparison orientation, in such a way that downward comparison would exert a stronger effect upon relationship quality for individuals high in social comparison orientation. More specifically, we expected a three-way interaction indicating that the predicted two-way interaction between cognitive set and discontent would be stronger for individuals having a stronger orientation toward social comparison.